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Focused Discussion Invited Paper
A Dilemma for the Scientific Realist*
Howard Sankey†
Contemporary discussion of scientific realism is fuelled by debate between
scientific realists and advocates of various forms of anti-realism. Arguments
for and against scientific realism have led to vigorous debate and the
development of compromise positions. Yet an unresolved tension remains
at the heart of the realist position. I wish to draw attention to a problem
that divides scientific realists among themselves. The problem stems from
the relation between science and common sense.
As traditionally understood, scientific realism is a view about the aim of
science. The aim of science is to discover the truth about the world. Scientific
progress consists in progress toward that aim. Progress is either increase in
the stock of truths known about the world or convergence on a true theory
of the world. Truth is correspondence with reality. A claim about the world
is true just in case the world is the way it is said to be. The truth sought by
science is not restricted to truth at the empirical level of what is observable by
the human senses unaided. Science seeks and succeeds in discovering truths
about theoretical entities, properties and states of affairs that are unable to
be detected by means of observation alone. The world in which these entities,
properties, and states of affairs are found is an objective reality that exists
independently of human thought, language, or conceptual activity.
Scientific realism may be distinguished from common-sense realism about
the items of ordinary experience. According to common-sense realism, the
ordinary items with which we interact on a daily basis are real. They
exist independently of human cognitive activity. We arrive at knowledge of
such things by means of our senses. Sometimes our senses lead us astray.
But for the most part they are reliable. Some ordinary things are artifacts
made by humans. Others occur naturally. Items of ordinary common sense
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do not depend for their continued existence on human mental activity.
Whereas scientific realism is opposed to anti-realism about theoretical
entities, common-sense realism stands opposed to skepticism about the
external world and idealist denials of the mind-independent status of ordinary
objects.
What is the relation between scientific realism and common-sense
realism? They may seem to go hand in hand. Yet a moment’s reflection
reveals the situation is more complicated. Some argue that there is conflict
between science and common sense. Indeed, some take common sense to be
an outmoded theory passed down by our primitive forebears. On this view,
science shows common sense to be mistaken. With the advance of science,
common sense is rejected. As we enter the brave new world of modern science,
we bid farewell to the erroneous beliefs of our ancestors.
The idea of a conflict between science and common sense acquires special
significance in the context of scientific realism. To see this, suppose that
there is indeed a conflict between what science tells us and the dictates of
common sense. To use Eddington’s example, suppose science tells us that the
“substantial” table of common sense is “nearly all empty space” rather than
solid matter (Eddington 1933, xii). A realist stance advises us to take what
science tells us as the truth about the world. But what if science conflicts
with common sense? Both cannot be true. If we accept what science tells us,
and science conflicts with common sense, we must reject common sense as
mistaken. In this way, a realist stance toward science leads to the overthrow
of common sense. Common-sense realism awaits a similar fate.
Some scientific realists are eliminativists about common sense. They will
welcome this result. But I think it spells trouble. The trouble is due to the
fact that observation provides the evidential basis for science. The empirical
evidence on which science is based is observational, deriving either from
immediate sense perception or from instrumentation. But observation is part
of common sense. Observation by means of the senses is the primary means
by which we obtain knowledge of the ordinary objects of common sense. If
common sense is to be rejected, observation must be rejected as well. Without
common sense, the evidential basis for science disappears. We would have no
basis to accept science in the first place. Worse: if we have no basis to accept
science, we have no basis to reject common sense. So we must accept common
sense instead of science. To reject common sense on the basis of science is
self-defeating.
This leads to the following dilemma. On the one hand, we may both
accept scientific realism and agree that there is a conflict between science
and common sense. If we do this, we remove the evidential basis for science
and have no reason to accept science in the first place. On the other hand,
we may accept scientific realism and endorse common sense. If we do this,
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we must reject the conflict between science and common sense. But if we
seek to reconcile science with common sense, we must show that the conflict
between science and common sense is an illusion.
The first option requires the scientific realist to develop an account of
the evidential basis of science in which ordinary experience plays no role. I
see little meaningful prospect for this. I prefer instead to explore the second
option. Is there any way to reconcile science and common sense?
In fact, the ordinary conception of common sense is ambiguous. There
is the practical skill of the craftsman or technician. There are widely held
beliefs found throughout a culture in a historical period. There are the
rudimentary sense-based beliefs about our immediate surroundings on which
everyday practical actions are based. The ordinary conception of common
sense captures all three of these things.
To resolve the dilemma we must focus on the rudimentary form of
common sense. One may possess common sense without possessing technical
skill or craft. The widely held beliefs of a culture may be eliminated with the
advance of science. But sense-based beliefs involved in practical interaction
with our immediate environment have a more solid basis. The advance of
science may lead to the overthrow of the widely held beliefs of particular
cultures. But beliefs closely integrated with everyday practical action are
less likely to be rejected. I call this form of common sense “basic common
sense.” For the most part, it survives the advance of science. It provides
the evidential basis on which science is founded. Scientific realism and basic
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